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DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN WEST VIRGINIA:
State ex rel. Dowdy v. Robinson
In State ex rel. Dowdy v. Robinson1 the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals substantially altered the double jeopardy
law of the state. Dowdy was indicted for breaking and entering a
nightclub. The indictment specified the building's location as 220-
22nd Street in Huntington, West Virginia. The proof presented at
trial indicated that the nightclub was located at 200-22nd Street.
The trial court granted a motion for a directed verdict of not
guilty on the ground that the variance' was fatal to the prosecu-
tion's case.s Dowdy was subsequently reindicted for the breaking
and entering, the only difference between the second indictment
from the first being the address correction. The defense filed a
writ of prohibition, contending that a retrial would violate
Dowdy's rights under the United States4 and West Virginia 5 Con-
stitutions not to be placed in double jeopardy. The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals agreed. In so ruling it adopted both a
new rule on the double jeopardy consequences of an acquittal ver-
dict and an additional test for determining what constitutes the
"same offense" for double jeopardy purposes.6 The court ruled
1 257 S.E.2d 167 (W. Va. 1979).
"A variance arises when the evidence adduced at trial establishes facts dif-
ferent from those alleged in an indictment." Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100,
105 (1979), citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
3 Both the majority and the dissent in Dowdy agreed that the trial court
should have either struck the street number as surplusage or should have declared
a mistrial for manifest necessity. Either of these actions would have permitted the
defendant to be retried.
A retrial is allowed in the case of a mistrial for manifest necessity because the
defendant's double jeopardy right is outweighed by the public interest in affording
the prosecution one full and fair opportunity to present evidence to the jury. See
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978). A trial court may strike any part of
an indictment so long as it is not a matter of substance but mere form or surplus-
age. See State v. McGraw, 140 W. Va. 547, 85 S.E.2d 849 (1955).
4 U.S. CONsT. amend. V, which provides in pertinent part that no "person be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
" W. VA. CONsT. art. 3, § 5, which provides in pertinent part that "[n]o person
shall... in any criminal case ... be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty for
the same offense."
6 State ex rel. Dowdy v. Robinson, 257 S.E.2d 167, 169-70 (W. Va. 1979).
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that every acquittal is a complete and absolute bar to any further
prosecution for the "same offense" no matter how erroneous the
verdict may be.7 It further held that "same offense," as used in
the West Virginia Constitution," shall be defined by either the
"same evidence" test or the "same transaction" test, whichever
provides the defendant with greater protection against multiple
prosecutions.9  The Dowdy case has led to considerable
confusion.10
I. THE AcQurrrL TEST
Prior to Dowdy West Virginia law had recognized a distinc-
tion between acquittals based on legal grounds and acquittals
based on factual grounds. The court had held that "[a]n acquittal
of a person on the merits of an offense is a bar to his second pros-
ecution for that offense."'11 West Virginia Code section 61-11-1312
also granted a defendant double jeopardy protection whenever he
was acquitted on the merits by a jury. West Virginia Code section
61-11-14,1s on the other hand, entitled the state to retry a defen-
dant who had been acquitted on the basis of "a variance between
the allegations and the proof of the indictment or other accusa-
tion, or upon an exception to the form or substance thereof. '14 In
Dowdy the court declared section 61-11-14 unconstitutional be-
cause it "allows multiple prosecutions of the same defendant for
the same offense and expressly provides for a second prosecution
7 Id. at 169.
8 See note 5 supra.
Id. at 170.
10 See State ex rel. Johnson v. Hamilton, 266 S.E.2d 125, 128 (W. Va. 1980).
1 State ex rel. Zirk v. Muntzing, 146 W. Va. 878, 891, 122 S.E.2d 851, 859
(1961), citing State v. Shelton, 116 W. Va. 75, 81, 178 S.E. 633, 635 (1935).
" W. VA. CODE § 61-11-13 (1977 Replacement Vol.) provides:
A person acquitted by the jury upon the facts and merits on a former
trial may plead such acquittal in bar of a second prosecution for the
same offense, notwithstanding any defect in the form or substance of the
indictment or accusation on which he was acquitted.
"' W. VA. CODE § 61-11-14 (1977 Replacement Vol.) provides:
A person acquitted of an offense, on the ground of a variance between
the allegations and the proof of the indictment or other accusation, or
upon an exception to the form or substance thereof, may be arraigned
again upon a new indichnent or other proper accusation, and tried and
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after an acquittal ... ." Thus, all acquittals, whether based on
legal or factual grounds, serve to bar further prosecution for the
same offense in West Virginia.
In support of its holding in Dowdy regarding acquittals, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals relied upon two United
States Supreme Court decisions, Sanabria v. United States1 and
United States v. Scott. 7 In Sanabria the defendant received a
directed verdict of acquittal on a federal gambling charge.1 8 The
federal offense required Lhat there be a violation of state law in
relation to numbers or horse betting. At the end of the prosecu-
tion's case the defendant moved that all evidence of numbers bet-
ting be excluded because it did not violate the state statute in-
cluded in the indictment. The court initially denied the motion,
but after the defense had rested the court reversed its earlier rul-
ing and granted the defendant's prior motion. The defense then
moved for a directed verdict of acquittal because no evidence re-
mained in the record to connect the defendant with the horse rac-
ing. The motion was granted.1 '
Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall held that the prose-
cution was barred from retrying the defendant because his acquit-
tal was granted on the basis of insufficient evidence,2 0 the insuffi-
ciency being due to an erroneous evidentiary ruling on the part of
the trial court.21 The Court concluded that the defendant was
"truly acquitted" because the verdict was "a resolution, correct or
not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense
charged. '22 It is important to recognize that the determining fac-
tor in Sanabria was not the mere use of the word "acquittal," but
rather, the nature of the acquittal, that is, the fact the acquittal
was based upon the "factual elements" was determinative.
"' State ex rel. Dowdy v. Robinson, 257 S.E.2d 167, 171 (W. Va. 1979).
10 437 U.S. 54 (1978).
17 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
18 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970).
19 Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 58-59 (1978).
20 Id. at 68-69.
21 Id. The trial court was in error when it excluded all evidence of numbers
betting.
22 Id. at 71, quoting Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 30, n.8 (1977), quoting
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977).
1980]
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In United States v. Scott2" the defendant was charged with
two federal drug offenses. Although motions by the defendant for
a dismissal on the ground of prejudicial preindictment delay"4
were made prior to and during trial, the trial court did not grant
the motion until after the defense had rested. On appeal the pros-
ecution sought a reversal of the trial court's ruling. The defendant
asserted that the appeal was barred by double jeopardy.25
Justice Rehnquist, in authoring the Court's opinion, held
that double jeopardy did not prohibit the prosecution's appeal or
prevent a new trial because the trial court's ruling was not "a res-
olution ... of some or all of the factual elements of the offense
charged."2 The dismissals were not based upon any of the factual
elements of the drug offenses for which Scott was indicted, but
instead were based upon an erroneous legal interpretation of what
constitutes preindictment delay.27 The trial court was unable to
render a decision on the merits because the defendant himself
sought to terminate the trial prior to any factual resolution. In
such a case double jeopardy does not apply because the defendant
has in effect waived his right by requesting a dismissal on purely
constitutional or legal grounds as opposed to factual grounds.28
Scott and Sanabria are distinguishable because in Scott the
dismissals were based on a constitutional claim while in Sanabria
the acquittal was based on a lack of evidence of a factual ele-
ment.29 The label of "acquittal" or "dismissal" is not important.
What is important is that "the ruling of the judge, whatever its
label, actually represents a resolution. . . of the factual elements
of the offense charged."3 0 A "trial judge's characterization of his
23 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
U Preindictment delay is a constitutional defense based on the argument that
the time between the original accusation and the indictment of the defendant is so
long as to prejudice his defense in violation of his right to a speedy trial. See
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
:5 United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 84 (1978).
26 Id. at 97, quoting Sanabria v. Scott, 437 U.S. 54, 71 (1978).
17 United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 84 (1978).
2 Id. at 93.
1, Which defenses are constitutional or legal as opposed to factual? The an-
swer seems to be that defenses which go to the jury, such as entrapment, insanity,
and self-defense, are factual, while defenses which are decided by the trial court
judge, such as preindictment delay, are legal.
SO United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97 (1978), quoting United States v.
[Vol. 83
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own action cannot control the classification of the action. '31
Therefore, regardless of whether the trial judge labels his action a
dismissal or an acquittal, the inquiry on review in relation to
double jeopardy is whether the action amounts to a resolution of
factual issues.
The policy expressed by these two cases is based on the
premise that a trial is a fact finding and evaluation proceeding.
Its primary purpose is to make a determination on the basis of
evidence. If the trial terminates before this determination has
been made, it has failed to perform its function. The prohibition
against double jeopardy is designed to prevent the government
from repeatedly trying "an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty."3' Granting double jeopardy
protection in cases such as Scott does not promote the purpose of
a trial because there has been no determination of the factual is-
sues. A trial places a defendant in jeopardy of being found guilty.
In Scott the defendant himself requested an end to his trial
before there was a verdict. If no determination of guilt or inno-
cence has been made on the basis of the evidence, then the defen-
dant never actually risked a guilty verdict. When a dismissal or
acquittal is predicated upon an evaluation of the factual elements
of a charge, then double jeopardy will surely apply. In such a case
the dismissal or acquittal would be the result of a failure of the
prosecution's case.
In Dowdy the court interpreted Scott and Sanabria as "ac-
cording magic" to any and all verdicts of acquittal.33 The majority
concluded that the United States Supreme Court required double
jeopardy protection in the case of all acquittals, whether based on
factual or legal grounds.u In coming to this conclusion the West
Virginia court seemed to concentrate upon the fact that Sanabria
was acquitted while the charges against Scott were only dis-
missed. Scott and Sanabria, however, turn not on the magic of
Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977).
31 Id. at 96.
32 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
3 State ex rel. Dowdy v. Robinson, 257 S.E.2d 167, 171 (W. Va. 1979).
34 Id. at 169.
1980]
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the word "acquittal" but on the basis of the acquittal.3 5 The fact
that the trial court in Dowdy termed its action an "acquittal" is
not determinative according to the United States Supreme Court
standard. Justice Neely, writing for the majority in Dowdy, ap-
parently failed to recognize that a "trial judge's characterization
of his own action cannot control the classification of the action."
3
Justice Miller pointed this out in his dissent when he wrote that
"the trial court's labeling of the motion which terminates the trial
will not be controlling, but rather an examination will be made of
the underlying record to determine the substantive nature of the
court's ruling. ' ' 7
Scott and Sanabria clearly support Justice Miller's dissent-
ing opinion. Sanabria's acquittal was "an erroneous resolution in
the defendant's favor on the merits of the charge,"38 while in
Scott the dismissal was "a legal judgment that a defendant...
may not be punished because of a supposed constitutional viola-
tion." In fact, Justice Brennan's dissent in Scott attacks the ma-
jority decision for the very reason that it does not grant acquittals
unqualified double jeopardy protection.4
Dowdy will produce a noticeable change in the manner in
which acquittals are granted in West Virginia. Since an acquittal
is now synonymous with double jeopardy protection, trial judges
should be very reluctant to grant judgments of acquittal. They
can be expected to label their rulings "dismissals" whenever pos-
sible. By adopting this strategy a judge can eliminate the possibil-
ity that he might mistakenly grant double jeopardy protection to
a defendant. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals might
look beyond the label of "dismissal," but the label of "acquittal"
is granted unconditional double jeopardy protection."1 Judges
must now be very careful when they award judgments of acquit-
35 Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 71 (1978); United States v. Scott,
437 U.S. 82, 97 (1978).
3 United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 96 (1978).
37 State ex reL. Dowdy v. Robinson, 257 S.E.2d 167, 172 (W. Va. 1979) (Miller,
J., dissenting).
Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 78 (1978).
19 United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98 (1978).
40 "The Court's attempt to draw a distinction between 'true acquittals' and
other final judgments favorable to the accused, quite simply, is unsupportable in
either logic or policy." Id. at 103 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41 See State ex reL. Dowdy v. Robinson, 257 S.E.2d 167, 169 (W. Va. 1979).
[Vol. 83
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tal. Dowdy gives acquittals a clear meaning, the consequences of
which even laymen will have no difficulty in understanding. The
defendant will have the advantage of knowing for certain if an-
other trial is possible.
II. THE SAMz OFFENSE TEST
Justice Neely stated in Dowdy that "no retrial on the same
offense is permissible" after a judgment of acquittal." Having
determined that the defendant had in fact been acquitted, the
court shifted its focus to the issue of whether the prosecution was
attempting to try Dowdy for the "same offense." The court ruled
that the "same offense" had been charged in both indictments.
43
In so ruling, the court discussed two tests which can be used in
determining the meaning of "same offense." Justice Neely ini-
tially focused on the "same evidence" test, which was adopted by
the United States Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United
States."4 The "same evidence" test requires that "where the same
act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are
two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof
of a fact which the other does not."45 Prior to Dowdy this was the
rule in West Virginia.4" The West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals also considered the "same transaction" test in Dowdy. It
provides that offenses are the same if they "grow out of a single
criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction."'17 The "same
transaction" test has received only limited support in the United
42 Id.
4" Id. at 171.
44 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
45 Id. at 304. It is not enough for one offense to have an element which the
other offense does not in order for them to be different offenses according to the
"same evidence" test. Each offense must contain an element which the other does
not contain. For example, joyriding and auto theft are the "same offense" because
auto theft contains all of the elements of joyriding plus an additional element, i.e.,
the intent to permanently deprive the owner of his automobile. Lesser included
offenses will always be the "same offense" under the "same evidence" test. See
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
46 See State v. Pietranton, 140 W. Va. 444, 84 S.E.2d 774 (1954); State v.
Taylor, 130 W. Va. 74, 42 S.E.2d 549 (1947); State v. Friedey, 73 W. Va. 684, 80
S.E. 1112 (1914).
47 See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 170 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring),
quoting Ash v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
1980]
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States Supreme Court.4 8 The court in Dowdy decided to "adopt
both the 'same evidence' test and the 'same transaction' test for
determining whether the 'same offense' is involved for double
jeopardy purposes with an accompanying rule that whichever test
affords the defendant the greater protection ... must be
applied."'49
Justice Neely acknowledged that the court was extending
broader protection to defendants on the basis of the West Vir-
ginia Constitution than the United States Supreme Court granted
under the federal Constitution."0 The adoption of this dual stan-
dard has led to much confusion regarding the "same offense"
concept.
In State ex rel. Johnson v. Hamilton5 1 the court attempted
to dispel the confusion surrounding the new "same offense" test.
02
The court said the confusion resulted from the fact that double
jeopardy has two elements. It protects a defendant against multi-
ple trials for the same offense and against multiple punishments
for the same offense in a single trial. While the "same evidence"
test applies to both elements of double jeopardy, the "same trans-
action" test applies only to multiple trials and not to multiple
punishments in a single trial.53 The "same transaction" test, the
court continued, "does not preclude separate punishments for
separate crimes." But if by "separate crimes" the court means
crimes that are not the "same offense," then it has devised "a
48 Apparently only Justices Brennan and Marshall support the adoption of
the "same transaction" test. Id.
4" State ex rel. Dowdy v. Robinson, 257 S.E.2d 167, 170 (W. Va. 1979).
50 Id. For authority to extend broader protection see State ex rel. Whitman v.
Fox, 236 S.E.2d 565 (W. Va. 1977).
' 266 S.E.2d 125 (W. Va. 1980). The defendant in Johnson was convicted of
the murder of a son. He sought a writ of prohibition to prevent himself from being
tried for the murder of the son's father, since both killings grew out of the same
transaction. The court ruled that the defendant could be tried for the murder of
the father because the trial for the murder of the son had taken place prior to the
Dowdy decision. Dowdy, the court declared, is to be applied prospectively and not
retroactively. If the first trial in Johnson had taken place after the Dowdy case
was decided the trial for the murder of the father would not have been permitted
under the "same transaction" test.
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clever procedural paradox. '55 The very standard the court
adopted in Dowdy for determining what constitutes the "same of-
fense" makes use of the "same transaction" test which the court
says does not apply to a single trial if the defendant is not receiv-
ing multiple punishments for the "same offense. '56 In other
words, the court is saying that the "same transaction" test is used
to determine what is the "same offense," but at the same time
saying that the "same transaction" test applies to multiple pun-
ishments only if they are not for the "same offense." The "same
offense" concept is being overworked. It is being made to serve in
two different stages of double jeopardy analysis with a different
meaning in each place.
An example may serve to demonstrate the paradox better. If
a person were to kidnap, rape, rob, and murder his victim in a
single criminal episode the "same offense" test adopted in Dowdy
would require that all of the charges be tried in a single trial be-
cause they all stem from the "same transaction." For double jeop-
ardy purposes all of the charges are the "same offense." The
court, however, says that this "does not preclude separate punish-
ments for separate crimes. '5 7 But how can the defendant be pun-
ished separately for the crimes of kidnapping, rape, robbery, and
murder if the court has already determined that they are the
"same offense" under the "same transaction" test? Logically, he
cannot be punished separately unless there are two independent
"same offense" tests. West Virginia, however, has but a single
"same offense" test. It is the same test as before Dowdy, that is,
the "same evidence" test.
As a practical matter, Dowdy did not adopt both the "same
evidence" test and the "same transaction" test for determining
what qualifies as the "same offense." This would involve a para-
dox as demonstrated by the above example. Rather, Dowdy af-
firmed the "same evidence" test for "same offense" purposes and
adopted the "same transaction" test as a procedural rule of join-
der under the guise of double jeopardy protection. The core of the
double jeopardy principle has always been the "same offense"
15 Id. at 130 (Miller, J., concurring).
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concept.58 If the offenses are not the same, then double jeopardy
analysis does not apply. 9 The "same evidence" test still applies
to both elements of double jeopardy, that is, multiple trials and
multiple punishments in a single trial. The "same transaction"
test, however, applies only to multiple trials and thus functions
independently from the "same evidence" test. The "same transac-
tion" test merely requires the joinder of offenses if the offenses
grow out of a single transaction. It does not address the issue of
whether the various offenses qualify as being the "same offense."
It is unfortunate that the court adopted the "same transaction"
test in such a way as to cause so much confusion.
The court has created several potential problems by adopting
the "same transaction" test. By conferring constitutional status
upon what amounts to a rule of joinder of offenses, the court has
made it questionable whether a defendant can waive his right to
joinder by requesting a severance. Courts have generally taken a
position against waiver of the constitutional right to double jeop-
ardy.60 Since the court created the right to joinder, it would prob-
ably rule that it could be waived by a requested severance. The
Dowdy decision raises another question. Would a defendant waive
his joinder right by pleading guilty to one of several offenses aris-
ing out of the "same transaction"? The court would almost have
to consider this a waiver in order to prevent defendants from
pleading guilty to minor offenses in an attempt to escape prosecu-
tion for major offenses.
III. CONCLUSION
The decisions in Dowdy to make acquittals synonymous with
double jeopardy protection and to adopt the "same transaction"
test are related. The acquittal test controls when double jeopardy
analysis applies and the "same transaction" test determines the
nature of that analysis. Both parts of the decision are an attempt
by the court to extend the greatest possible assistance to the indi-
vidual in securing double jeopardy protection. The right to be
free from double jeopardy is certainly worthy of protection. The
question that must be asked in the final analysis is whether the
Id. at 130 (Miller, J., concurring).
Id.
"'See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 514 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1975).
[Vol. 83
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court has gone too far in providing this protection. In judging the
ultimate wisdom of the court's decision, there must be a balanc-
ing of the interest of society in convicting criminals against the
interest of the individual defendant in being protected from the
state. The policy behind the double jeopardy provision is prima-
rily the protection of the innocent from the power of the govern-
ment. Whether this policy is advanced by prohibiting the retrial
of a defendant who has been "acquitted" on the basis of a mis-
taken legal interpretation, or whether it is advanced by requiring
the prosecution to join all of the charges against a defendant in a
single trial can receive no definitive answer at this time."'
Gary A. Collias
" The reader's attention should be drawn to State ex rel. Watson v. Fergu-
son, 274 S.E.2d 440 (W. Va. 1980). This case was decided too late to be analyzed
in the text of this article. In Watson the court declared that "where multiple
homicides occur even though they are in close proximity in time, if they are not
the result of a single volitive act of the defendant, they may be tried and punished
separately..." Id. at 448. Apparently West Virginia has abandoned the "same
transaction" test in favor of a "same act" test. The Watson decision is clearly
inconsistent with Dowdy and Johnson. No pattern emerges from this line of cases.
1980]
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